Understanding Third and Fourth Age Subjectivity from Mass Observation Responses
In outlining the related history and methodologies of MO and the U3A, the previous chapter discussed the relationship between the third and fourth ages. It was seen that the fourth age featured differently in the respective accounts of the third age offered by Third Age Trust cofounders, Peter Laslett and Michael Young. However, Young's argument that the concept should simply be dropped has not borne fruit, and the fourth age has continued to be used in the sense it was defined by Laslett as 'an era of final dependence, decrepitude and death' (4). In a 2011 newspaper article commenting on the consequences of this dual terminology, Anne Karpf contrasted the recent publication of a Gold Age Power List with, first, findings from the Care Quality Commission, that older patients were regularly left dehydrated and undernourished in hospital, and, second, research by Age Concern that most over-65s with disabilities were receiving inadequate care. Furthermore, she complained that such a division obscured the possibility of considering life in the round across its whole span: 'Productive ageing' or 'successful ageing' -now common conceptssupposedly result from the exercise of willpower and choice; but they presume the existence of 'unproductive' and 'unsuccessful' ageing. Old age today, it seems, only befalls those too powerless, poor or stupid to do something about it -the un-Botoxed masses. We're (almost) all Dorian Grays now, tasking the fourth agers with doing our ageing for us: they are old so that we don't have to be.
[ ... ].
Obviously I'm not arguing that we shouldn't sustain vital, creative and sexual lives for as long as possible, but the idea that old age can be arrested and mastered has made ageing more frightening and harder to bear. It prevents us from seeing the arc and span of human life in all its stages. It stops us from understanding that ageing, while undoubtedly a challenging stage of life (but then adolescence is hardly a bagatelle), can be a rich part of human experience (Npag).
Yet, as noted in the previous chapter, this division persists because, as Haim Hazan argues, it is a constitutive feature of modern secular societies which depend in practice for their everyday functioning on the complete exclusion of the idea that death might be part of life, and, more specifically, through the intensified common interest of the active old and many ageing professionals in maintaining this absolute division. Such propensities run deep in capitalist globalizing cultures, for as Renata Salecl (2008) has argued in terms of the apparent lifestyle and other choices consequent on contemporary consumer culture, paradoxically given our mortality as consumers 'aging, too, appears a matter of choiceit is up to every individual to "do" something against it, or better work on not showing the signs of aging, as well as try to follow many proposed suggestions on how to prevent death' (362). Recently, Chris Gilleard and Paul Higgs (2010) have sought to rectify the failure of the 'cultural turn' in gerontological studies to address the fourth age in the same way that it has embraced, what they term, 'third-age studies' by '(re)theorising the fourth age, [in order to] give it a more cogent status within gerontology, a status beyond that of an under-theorised residual social category' (122). Drawing on earlier work of theirs, they argue that the third age is not a stage of life but a cultural field governed by consumption practices, socialized by postwar mass consumer society, and defined by 'the rejection of that which is old because it is old' (122). In contrast to this, they argue, the fourth age is not a cultural field but a symbolic space which exerts a shaping force over the third age and gives it meaning:
The fourth age functions as a social imaginary because it represents not so much a particular cohort or stage of life but as a kind of terminal destination -a location stripped of the social and cultural capital that is most valued and which allows for the articulation of choice, autonomy, self-expression, and pleasure in later life. (123) They also describe it as similar to a black hole in that its scope can only 'be apprehended through its effects on objects that surround it'
